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WHAT NEXT FOR THE BRICS BANK? 
A new development bank to be created by the ‘Rising Powers’ of Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and South Africa (BRICS) is intended to promote greater cooperation between 
developing countries, and address what is seen by many as a history of misguidance 
and underinvestment by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
However, several questions remain about the establishment of the BRICS bank and 
its potential impact on future development cooperation. The timeframe for its 
creation is still uncertain and economic and political links between the BRICS countries 
need to be strengthened in order for them to agree a clear development agenda to 
underpin the new institution.
Challenges ahead
The commitment to launch a BRICS Development Bank (BRICS Bank) has 
been greeted as a potential game-changer for global development practice. 
However, the BRICS Bank was not launched as expected at the 2013 BRICS 
Summit in Durban, South Africa. The assembled heads of state did agree to 
establish the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) - a stabilisation 
fund of $100 billion in reserves, and a BRICS Business Council to stimulate 
trade and investment.  However, the launch of the BRICS Bank itself was 
postponed until the next summit in Brazil during 2014.  
Numerous areas of uncertainty remain regarding the creation of the BRICS 
Bank. These include location, capital structure, governance structure, 
leadership and the criteria that will determine what projects it funds.   Other 
expected difficulties are obtaining a top credit rating for the BRICS Bank 
and reconciling the BRICS countries’ diverse economic and political interests. 
The motivation for establishing a BRICS bank is to be a counterpart to the 
World Bank and IMF, and promote a vision of development driven by 
developing countries. The BRICS have combined foreign currency reserves 
of $4.4 trillion and account for 43 per cent of the world’s population. 
One prominent proposal has suggested that the bank be capitalised with 
$41 billion from China, $18 billion from Brazil, Russia and India and $5 billion 
from South Africa. If voting rights within the bank are linked to capital 
contribution, India, Brazil and South Africa are unlikely to match China’s 
contribution or have equal voting rights.  
Despite articulating common development goals, the economic and political 
relations between the BRICS are still uneven.  For example, whilst China is 
the largest trading partner of most of the BRICS, the others trade relatively 
little with each other. Political conflict exists between India and China with 
regard to their respective roles in Asia, and Brazil, Russia and South Africa 
focus largely on their regional political standing over and above their relations 
with other BRICS.  
The limited scope of business and diplomatic relations between the BRICS 
beyond China hinders their ability to create a common development agenda 
to underpin a new BRICS Bank.
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Historical perspective
The provision of financing for development, 
as we think of it today, is a recent 
phenomenon.  It was born in the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (which became the World 
Bank), set up in the aftermath of World 
War II to help rebuild Europe within a new, 
US-based international economic system. 
With an overwhelming focus on Europe it 
did not provide a loan to an African 
government until 1950.  By 1957 there were 
still only two African World Bank members. 
This changed during the 1960s with 
decolonialisation and especially after 1968 
when Robert  McNamara became  president 
of the World Bank. The later focus of 
development finance on low-income 
countries (LICs)  was mainly a product of the 
1970s oil shocks and concurrent collapse in 
commodity prices.
As the World Bank’s lending to Africa 
expanded over the 1980s, conditionalities 
grew to the extent that by 1990 over a third 
of the Bank’s lending to sub-Saharan Africa 
was structural adjustment lending of one 
form or another. Such conditionality 
provision proved unpopular and the focus 
of much heated debate. The IMF, which 
started specifically as an institution to 
provide short-term loans to member states 
suffering balance-of-payments crises, saw 
its remit expanded in a similar way. Its role 
in developing countries was not especially 
prominent until after 1977, in line with the 
general crisis period which brought the 
World Bank into closer involvement with 
African, Asian and Latin American states.  
Having criticised the approach of the World 
Bank and IMF,  East Asian countries (after 
suffering a financial crisis in 1997-8) began 
accumulating very large foreign exchange 
reserves as a defence mechanism against 
balance-of-payments crises which could 
bring conditionality provisions into effect.
Changing the future of 
development cooperation
While the scope of the BRICS coalition 
has widened quickly, its focus was initially 
on the reform of multilateral institutions, 
particularly the IMF and World Bank. A BRICS Bank has been seen as a direct challenge to developed nations’ 
dominance of traditional fora. These institutions have been criticised by the BRICS countries, and other developing 
countries, in three general areas: governance, approach and outcome. The governance structures of the IMF and 
World Bank are said to be dominated by industrialised countries, particularly the G7.  
The Chiang Mai Initiative
While the remit of the BRICS Bank overlaps with that of the 
World Bank, the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement 
(CRA) could present a direct challenge to the IMF.  One close 
precursor to the CRA is the Chiang Mai Initiative signed in May 
2000 between the Association of Southeastern Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) countries plus China, Japan and Korea. The initiative 
was multilateralised in 2010 and renamed the Chiang Mai 
Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM). The aim of CMIM is to 
strengthen the capacity of the region to safeguard against 
increased risks and challenges in the global economy. The core 
objectives are to address balance-of-payments and short-term 
liquidity difficulties in the region, as well as to supplement 
existing international financial arrangements. What can CMIM 
tell us about the potential role of the new stabilisation fund, 
the CRA? 
• CMIM is limited to a regional grouping. The CRA would be 
the first attempt to broaden such agreements to a global 
level. Of course, CMIM is limited to a currency swap and has 
no link to any development bank function.
• CMIM remains IMF linked. Only 30 per cent of a member’s 
quota is accessible without an IMF programme (the goal is 
40 per cent by 2014.) For the remaining 70 per cent the 
member state must agree to an IMF programme, including 
policy prescriptions. 
• Serious doubts have been raised about the ability of CMIM 
to provide a financial safety net. Researchers have pointed 
out that it does not amount to an actual fund, but rather to 
a broad agreement to provide funds in case they are 
needed. Institutional surveillance mechanisms have not yet 
been established, and neither have rapid response 
procedures.
• The CMIM was tested in late 2008, before it was 
multilateralised, as a result of the financial crisis. Analysts 
argue that its small size and lack of rapid response 
procedures rendered it unusable. Instead, countries resorted 
to bilateral currency swaps with Northern countries,
• One likely key difference from the CMIM is that the CRA 
will not include a link to the IMF which brings about policy 
conditionalities in the event of crisis. Nevertheless, 
questions remain as to whether a set of institutional 
mechanisms can be developed to provide disbursements 
according to agreed criteria in a way that does not replicate 
the much-criticised IMF procedures.
• It is clear that the world is changing, and that a key concern 
of the rising powers is stabilisation in the event of crisis, a 
role they feel the IMF is not adequately performing.  
Neither CMIM nor the CRA is likely to represent the last 
attempt to create such an agreement. The role of the IMF 
remains open to debate and contestation.
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Quota restrictions and presidential selection 
ensures the continuance of this authority. 
Africa holds only three seats on the World 
Bank’s 25-seat board. Several approaches 
employed by these institutions have been 
attacked, from IMF loan conditionalities to 
the choice of projects financed by the World 
Bank.  There are also continued critiques of 
IMF and World Bank dominance of the 
development discourse, a lack of 
participation by LICs, and negative social 
outcomes.
Ideally, the BRICS Bank would reduce the 
up-front risk of investment and attract 
further early-stage finance, transfer project 
knowledge and reduce project risk by 
holding recipient governments to account. 
At this stage, it is impossible to say whether 
the BRICS Bank does indeed represent a 
challenge to established institutions such as 
the World Bank and the IMF.  Yet as an 
alternative mechanism for providing 
development financing it does represent a 
necessary (though not sufficient) condition 
for such a challenge. The remits of a BRICS 
Bank and the CRA would clearly overlap 
with those of the World Bank and IMF. 
Countries have adopted similar schemes in 
the recent past to allow for mutual 
assistance in balance-of-payments 
stabilisation.  Initiatives such as the CMIM 
have previously worked either bilaterally or 
on fairly narrow regional bases. 
If the BRICS Bank, as has been suggested, 
takes the CMIM as the basis for a wider 
agreement, it will be the first time such a regional agreement has been posited as the foundation for an institution 
with global reach.  The ‘Rising Powers’ countries have often stated that they are not expecting the BRICS Bank to 
bring about a revolution in the international economic system. Brazil’s Finance Minister Guido Mantega has pointed 
to the need for Brazil to maintain trade flows during possible global financial market turbulence as a key reason for 
the BRICS Bank.  Private sector observers have made similar statements, suggesting the BRICS Bank should be an 
auxiliary source of funding that is more aligned to the BRICS development agenda, rather than a counterweight to 
the World Bank. 
The BRICS leaders’ statement from the 2013 Summit  cites ‘insufficient long term financing and foreign direct 
investment’ as the reasons behind the creation of the  BRICS Bank, thereby avoiding direct criticism of the IMF or 
World Bank. The institutional structure of the BRICS Bank, and especially its disbursement mechanisms, will indicate 
whether there has been a clear break from previous models, and a new emphasis placed on South-South 
Cooperation (cooperation between developing countries). These are due to be agreed by the 2014 BRICS Summit in 
Brazil. 
Impact on developmental outcomes
Press reports have suggested that the focus of the BRICS Bank’s investments will be in infrastructure, energy and 
telecommunications.  This would be a return to the infrastructure-focused aid that traditional donors left behind when 
they shifted towards social sector spending. There has also been a shift in Chinese and Indian funding to agricultural 
development, debt relief, and preferential market access. BRICS countries’ development support has also emphasised 
technical assistance particularly in agriculture and health.  
Lessons from Regional Development Banks
The proposed BRICS bank will have direct and indirect 
development impacts, which will need to be assessed. Indirectly, 
its activities will create demonstration effects that other 
institutions may seek to replicate. This is likely to depend on (a) 
how successful the bank is seen to be, and (b) how different it is 
from other institutions in its activities. These factors will also 
affect its direct impacts.
Perhaps the most important determinant of these factors will 
be the bank’s mandate regarding the sectors and locations 
where it will focus, and the forms of financing it will employ. 
The creation of the mandate and how it is interpreted in 
practice will be influenced by the sources of funds that capitalise 
the new bank, and how it is governed in terms of the allocation 
of voting rights.
The experience of other relevant institutions may be instructive. 
The Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) is capitalised by the 
Workers Support Fund, which it manages. This is aligned with 
its mandate to invest in machinery, industrial equipment and 
economic infrastructure. 
The Regional Development Banks (RDBs) have broader 
mandates, as well as different governance structures. Perhaps 
the key difference between them is the relative importance of 
lenders and borrowers. While the African Development Bank 
(AfDB) governance structure locks-in a majority for African 
countries (i.e. borrowers), the other RDBs allow a much larger 
role for non-borrowing members. For the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IADB) this is the US; for the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) it is Japan. These differences have a 
significant impact on each of the RDB’s activities. 
IDS_Master Logo
IDS Rapid Response Briefings are published by the Institute of Development Studies and aim to provide high- 
level analysis of rapidly emerging and unexpected global events and their impact on development policy and 
practice. To subscribe: www.ids.ac.uk/idsrapidresponsebriefings
Institute of Development Studies, Brighton BN1 9RE UK
T +44 (0) 1273 606261  F + 44 (0) 1273 621202  E ids@ids.ac.uk  W www.ids.ac.uk
Ra
pi
d R
es
po
ns
e B
R
IE
FI
N
G
 Rapid Response  BRIEFING  • WHAT NEXT FOR THE BRICS BANK?  ISSUE 03 • MAY 2013
Other common patterns in the BRICS’ approach to development include: 
• Basing aid on principles of South-South Cooperation that emphasise development 
‘partnership’ and mutual learning  rather than ‘donorship’.
• Focusing on mutual benefits without the attachments of policy conditionality in 
governance, economic policy or institutional reform. China, in particular, emphasises 
‘national sovereignty’ and development partners’ responsibility for their own long-
term development.
• Focusing on trade and commercial exchange as a basis for development, and designing 
assistance to complement foreign direct investment.  This focus still permits tied aid, 
although aid is not tied to policy conditionality. Examples of tying aid in this way 
include linking it to purchases from the source/donor country or channelling credit 
lines directly to companies rather than partner/recipient country governments.
• Focusing on individual project viability versus long-run debt sustainability.  China 
finances some projects with loans and others with grants. It is believed that strictly 
adhering to a recipient’s ability to repay leads to the infrastructure underinvestment 
seen in LICs.
• Applying the recent lessons of BRICS countries – especially Brazil, India and China 
– to LICs in areas from health to agriculture.
Recommendations
If the BRICS countries are to make progress achieving the goals they have set 
themselves with the BRICS Bank, a number of enabling conditions need to be in 
place, including:
• A  continued focus on domestic growth and stability in the BRICS.  Creating 
skilled jobs, promoting infrastructure investment, rationalising regulation and 
attracting foreign direct investment remain essential to the continued 
improvement of the wellbeing of citizens still emerging from poverty and to the 
political legitimacy of international development engagements by these countries.
• Deeper engagement of the BRICS in multilateral forums and regional trade 
forums such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), and advocacy for qualified 
leadership candidates from the BRICS.
• Pressure to align the policies of the new bank with sustainable development and 
other global public goods debates.  The BRICS Business Council has the potential 
to be a useful ally in some of these debates, particularly in the areas of energy 
security and water conservation.
• Promotion of transparent and democratic bank governance. This includes 
providing better quality trade and investment data with respect to the size and 
terms of financing flows, as well as the structure and conditions of deals, and 
concessions for natural resources. Demands for human rights, social impact and 
environmental sustainability criteria to be considered in investment decisions, and 
for engagement with the new bank by local populations and civil society, also 
need to be addressed.
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